

Gender Diversity in Philosophy: Data, Initiatives, and Common Concerns
presented by Carrie Figdor at Rice University, March 21, 2014

Thanks Melinda. Thanks Richard for inviting me for such a wonderful opportunity to present the latest data and discuss the initiatives that are being done, at least on the question of gender diversity. I also wanted to thank the Humanities Research Center for providing a lot of the funding for this. Because we're in an architecture building and the head of the Center is an architect, I should say architecture itself has a fairly large problem with gender diversity as well, which is very similar to this one. In fact, it's probably worse. So, with no further ado, I'm going to be presenting a lot of data, and then I'll talk about what's being done. In fact, Richard introduced some of the data that I will be presenting. And in a science talk, when you present data, a lot of times you begin by thanking your collaborators. So, I thought I would also begin by thanking my collaborators...

One of my collaborators is Colin McGinn. Colin McGinn apparently sent sexually tinged e-mails, or at least what most people would interpret as sexually tinged e-mails, to a graduate student. And as a result, he ended up leaving his job at University of Miami. This was a year or two years ago and the case made a lot of press. It's interesting why. I think there are probably certain stereotypes about philosophers and what they're supposed to be like that played into public perceptions of, "Oh my god! Here's this philosopher doing all this sexually bizarre stuff..." The actual facts of the case are hard to know. What came out was very limited as to what actually happened. But in anyway, the McGinn case did raise awareness in the wider world, not just in the academic world, not just in the philosophical world, of various problems within philosophy, so it opened up people's eyes. There's a lot to be said about having high profile cases to raise attention. He was our first poster person for a problem in the profession.

And then we've got the case of University of Colorado--Boulder. I'd like to thank the entire department. The issue there was that there was a new Site Visit Program set up by the American Philosophical Committee on the status of women and this was their very first site visit. What they found in the report, that was published online, was basically a climate of harassment and bullying. There was some sexual misconduct involving one or more particular people. They were not named in the report. The report was not prepared for legal purposes. It was just to assess what was going on and to provide specific recommendations on what to do. But as a result, the chair of the department was removed or replaced. And the graduate program has been temporarily suspended, and there was a lot of blogging on this whole case. A lot of anger was presented to the Site Visit Program for allegedly trying to promote feminist philosophy at the expense of the reputations of the male members of the department, and so on and so forth. There were a lot of accusations going back and forth. And again, from the point of view of just simply raising consciousness, this is terrific, right? Get it out there. There's publicity. This is the way problems start to get addressed.

And my final collaborator here is Peter Ludlow. I've always admired his work. I've interviewed him, in fact, for New Books in Philosophy. A great book on philosophy

of cognitive linguistics. His case is a little more difficult, in the sense that it's recent, and there are actual lawsuits going on, including Federal law suits. There were certain facts of the case in terms of some students having gone to particular venues and had drinks and ended up somehow at his apartment. There's all sort of facts out there, but beyond that, there are issues that are still being legally dealt with. I don't know any of the real facts of the case, and there's only so much that I can say about it.

But his course was cancelled for this semester after protests on the Northwestern campus. There was a lot of blogging about this. Was this vigilante justice? ..Again, we don't really know what the facts of the case are exactly. There are claims of some sort of wrongdoing, which may or may not have been established. But once again, you've got something to do with sexual harassment going on with a philosopher.

And this raises the question, "What the heck is going on in philosophy?" We have a long history in philosophy of denigration of the body. As Socrates put it, it's all about trying to prepare self for death, so your mind can be free of all the demands of the body and here, you've got all these people involved with all this very bodily stuff. There is a contrast between the general perception of what philosophy is and what philosophers do, and all the kind of things that they're actually doing. This clash of schemas is making these cases hit headlines in popular press and also, raises a lot of issues and anxieties within the profession itself.

With all that said, let me go through the plan of today's talk. First of all, I'm going to say a little bit about why we should care about the problem of diversity, specifically the underrepresentation of women in philosophy, and I'll say something about other underrepresented groups, and I'm going to focus on that because that's where we have the most data. Second of all, I'll go through some of that data. Then I'll go through a few of the initiatives that have been developed in recent years to address these problems. Then I'll address some worries about this--whether there are certain issues of fairness in terms of the hiring of women and so forth.

Let me start with a few motivations. These are not meant to be exhaustive, but they are some of the major motivations that come up when you're thinking about addressing issues of underrepresentation. First one is purely legal. If you have underrepresentation, and you become aware of these things, then it can help you avoid sex-related harassment and discrimination lawsuits. This assumes, let me just go into this a little bit more, that underrepresentation is a factor in harassment and discrimination. That's an empirical claim. From what I've seen, there's a mixed bunch of research on the connection between underrepresentation and harassment and discrimination. But the most recent paper I've seen, which is also a fascinating paper that just came out in *Law and Behavior* by Kabat-Farr and Cortina, found that underrepresentation is a factor in gender harassment but not sexual advance harassment. This is an umbrella term, and they divide it into two separate things. One of which is sexual advancing, when you're making unwanted sexual advances toward somebody. The other is more of a rejection. The other direction is where you're just denigrating somebody, you're hostile to somebody. You reject them in various verbal and non-verbal ways. One of these involves what you might call "actual" sexual advances to somebody and the other is various ways of rejecting them that are based on their gender. What they found was that the one type what they call gender

harassment, the rejection aspect, is correlated with underrepresentation of a group, whereas the sexual harassment, the advances, are not.

That's an important difference because it means what's really going on, as far as the relationship between underrepresentation and discrimination and harassment, is that the gendered harassment is typified by what's going on at Colorado Boulder, whereas what was involved with the cases of McGinn and Ludlow in particular, again we don't know precisely what went on there, but if you can imagine people like that or behavior like that, that is not correlated with the underrepresentation of women. So, it's important - It's a really interesting distinction, and Kabbat-Farr and Cortina do this on a basis of surveys in academic work groups, in non-academic offices, and in the military. They did it for representation of men as well as women. It's a really interesting study that I recommend people look at. As far as the legal issues go, you still have a relationship between underrepresentation of women in a particular work environment--there's academia or non-academia--and the way women are treated in that environment, whether or not there is sexual advancement or not. There is that connection.

The second reason we should care is just the practical reasons. So there's been a lot of stuff on the web recently about the career benefits of getting a philosophy degree, or more generally of a humanities degree. Philosophers are trained in critical and analytical thinking, organized writing, considering complex issues, thinking deeply about ourselves and about society and all of these benefits of philosophical training are not going to accrue to somebody who doesn't pursue philosophy beyond the intro level. So to the extent that these sorts of skills are prized by employers, and surveys have been done that show that they are, then, women not becoming majors, or not pursuing philosophical studies, even at just the undergraduate level are not getting the same sort of bang for their buck that they might were they to pursue more philosophy studies. This assumes of course that women are not going to get these skills elsewhere, but I think one of the implications or assumptions that philosophers make is that we somehow do it better. I'm happy to agree to that--that's okay with me.

Third reason we should care is, again, famous philosophers for a number of reasons, Helen Longino in particular, state that the research quality of an academic field is enhanced if you have diverse perspectives. If you have different people critiquing ideas the result, of course, is a stronger research program or research output or stronger paper. We all know this personally--when you write a paper, you send it to friends or colleagues, they comment on it, and you improve it, on the light of those comments. And so, this is basically the same idea large for a particular field and for research as a whole. It's also important that whatever the diverse perspectives are that they be listened to--that there be uptake of them. The problem that arises is that when you have underrepresented groups, which might also be, denigrated, there's hostility towards them. They're isolated. So even if they have the diverse perspectives, they're not going to be listened to. And so, underrepresentation can indirectly undermine the epistemic quality of the research in a particular field if the underrepresented groups--these diverse perspectives--are being undermined by that underrepresentation.

Now, there's the assumption here that women have perspectives to add. Not just that one is doing metaphysics of neuroscience, but that somehow the fact that they're women pursuing these things there's something going on there that's not just the fact

that they're a neuroscientist. I think there's plenty of research in philosophy of science, from feminist perspectives on science, Evelyn Fox Keller, and many other people, that shows that the fact that women may come at particular problems from a different perspective may provide a completely different hypothesis or approach to theorizing. How much that is a gendered thing doesn't in a sense really matter. The point is just that you are getting these different perspectives.

Then, finally, there's just the simple moral argument, which maybe should be stronger than it is. People will listen to practical stuff more than they will theoretical moral stuff. There is a sense of *injustice*. If underrepresentation is the result of discrimination and unfair treatment, discrimination and unfair treatment are considered injustices, and so, there's a straightforward argument for why we should try to eliminate underrepresentation. This assumes that underrepresentation is not due to something like well, women are just bad at philosophy or they just don't like it, it's just not for them. The response there is that--yeah these are hypotheses but there's no reason to think that they're at all true.

So those are the basic four motivations. I've said they're not exhaustive, but I think they do give us strong reason conjointly to understand the problem and to try to address it.

Now, I'm going to go to the data section. First, I'll talk about the leaky pipeline, which Richard mentioned. I co-authored a study with Molly Paxton and Valerie Tiberius, published in 2011, where we contacted the registrars of 98 doctoral granting departments and 64 liberal arts schools, and we got about somewhere between 30-35% responses from each, so we ended up getting 56 institutions, and we got pieces of data on: What's your gender breakdown for intro level? What's your gender breakdown for your majors? What's your gender breakdown for your faculty? We combined them because there wasn't any statistically significant difference. We had a total of just over 11,000 intro philosophy students, 3,443 majors, 1,359 graduate students, and then a little over 700 full-time faculty from these 56 schools. What we found was 2 things: One was that the only statistically significant drop was from the intro level to the major level. Once females made it to the major level, then there was a tapering from major to grad student to faculty, but none of that difference was statistically significant. We also found a correlation between the number of majors at an institution and the number of women faculty at that institution.

So, just to give you the picture of our results, here you see, this is the drop off from the intro level to the major level, and that was statistically significant. These were not. So basically, you have a big drop here, we called it the "intro-major cliff." You have a big drop off there, where you've got anywhere from 40-50% varying, not deeply different balance between men and women and intro classes and then a drop off at the major level. Once you get the majors, there's dropping off, but it's not a cliff.

So, you've got a leaky pipeline that starts from the very beginning, that's the take home on that. When you get to doctorates, you have (this is data from 2009) approximately 30% of doctorates in philosophy are women. The 3 areas that are lower in terms of women are engineering, computer science, and physics. There are more women getting mathematics degrees and astronomy and astrophysics PhDs than there are getting philosophy degrees. Some people have hypothesized that one reason women don't go into philosophy is because it's perceived as a mathematics heavy discipline. I see this as *prima facie* evidence that hypothesis is probably not a good one

to pursue, but of course, here way at the top you get psychology, english, anthropology, and so forth. All the humanities are high up, and "all disciplines" is about 47%. A little bit less than half, but no big difference there in overall terms. Philosophy is down with STEM disciplines, which is bizarre. Why is philosophy such an outlier when it comes to the humanities, and even some of the sciences? Biology is up here.. Philosophy is very much of an outlier. You've got 2 pieces of data so far that say something odd is going on.

Then, you get to the jobs. You've got people who have degrees, the women who've made it that far--they've become majors, they've gone to graduate school and now they're in the job market. What we find is that approximately 21% of all faculty are female. 16.6% of all full time faculty and 26% of part time. This is a little bit less than what Richard gave. From what I understand is that for decades it's been around 20%, and it hasn't really budged. That may be changing relative to the benchmark of tenure, about 17% of tenured faculty are women. About 12.5% are tenured tracks. 24% are non-tenure track.

Now, I should say this data was published in 2011 based on statistics from the National Center for Education Statistics 2009 report, which itself was derived from data collected in 2003. This is not the most recent data. It's the most recent data we've got at this general level. There is more data collecting going on at the moment, and it could be that these numbers have increased. In fact, I'd probably be surprised if they hadn't increased somewhat. But it's not like there's been a complete reversal of this trend.

Then you look at high-profile jobs, Sally Haslanger, who was here 2 years ago, she did a study, which she may've shown, which looked at the top 20 departments as ranked by the Philosophical Gourmet Report. (That is sort of a self-study, people in the profession rate their peers, which itself some people might find problematic, but in any case these are the rankings that we've got.) Overall, she found that 20% of faculty in the top departments are women, all faculty. 19% of tenured faculty. Just to show you again, this is back in 2009, the lows were Pittsburgh and Austin and the highs were Columbia, which combines its faculty with Barnard, so you can kind of understand that, and Yale, which seems to do a nice job on its own, so there's a bit of a range from 10% to 33%. Again, this is a couple of years ago, but still the relative numbers are still quite low.

Let me say something about women of color, and other groups. I've been talking about gender diversity in general for women, but once you get to even more underrepresented groups, or groups where you have an intersection between being black and female, or any other sort of combination, everything is worse. The only way I can show how it's worse in terms of underrepresentation is to show what little data we've got. There's an estimated 30 female black women with philosophy PhDs working in North America, and that is out of 11,000 members of the APA. In the UK, I just saw this recently on the blog Daily News, there are 5 black philosophers employed in the UK, and 2 of them are in philosophy departments. When we're talking about underrepresentation of women, everything is sort of in spades for women of color. That will go for LGBT or any trans or any sort of other diversity related group. Hispanic/Latino, I tried to get data on this because I think given my background in South America, I'm interested in this particular group. I couldn't find any data. The people that I

asked, who're actually involved in the AP in various Hispanic or Latino committees there, don't have any data, but I'm quite sure it's pretty small. Really, who knows?

There's just a great lacuna of ignorance, facts that we just don't know. Back to the sort of erasure of women, you might say: publication rates. This is more recent work that's being done, not just jobs, not just majors and so forth. When you're in the profession and you've got a job, what happens to your work? Sally did a study of 7 top journals: Journal of Phil, Phil Review, Nous, Mind, Ethics, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, and Phil Studies. She found that for this 5 year period, 2002-2007, 12.4% of the authors were women. This ranged from a low in Mind-- 6%, 9 articles out of 141--to a high in Ethics of 19%. This is from her charts. Mind is just the worst one, so she kind of circled that. As you can see, the numbers here are not terrific. She broke that down to articles and then, discussions. Not good. Women that are in the profession that somehow manage to get to jobs and are managing to publish are not really getting into the top journals. Not even representative numbers relative to their numbers in the profession, this is even lower than that.

Citation: more recent data from Kieran Healy. He looked at 34,000 articles that were cited in 2,200 papers that were published in Phil Review, JPhil, Mind and Nous through a ten-year period 1993-2013. Of those, this is the references.

Who talks about who? It's not just a matter of did you get your article into one of these journals, but if somebody got something into one of these top journals, are they talking about your stuff? Is your stuff being discussed by the profession? What they found was that 3.9%, 4%, of these articles cited women. This is just in the references of these 2,200 papers. By comparison, citations of David Lewis alone were 6.3%. Now, David Lewis was an extremely influential person, I mean he's an outlier in every way. Still, it gives you some sort of a way to compare how one extremely influential man just totally swamps the number of all women cited in these references.

But it's not just the citations where women's work is not being discussed. You also have anthologies, and this goes to the intro level stuff. A study of 20 introductory level anthologies that were published in the year 2000, 6% of the authors there were women, and of these 6% almost half, 44%, were in gender coded issues, like feminism, sexism, abortion, and so forth-- the "women's" stuff. 7% were by Ayn Rand alone--a real major figure in the philosophy profession? I don't know. This is a study by Morgan Thompson, who is at Pitt now, Toni Adleberg and 2 of their cooperators at Georgia State.

It's not just the anthologies where women are just not there. Meghan Mastro did an analysis of 57 introductory level syllabi from 22 colleges, half of the top 40 small liberal arts colleges as ranked by U.S. News & World Report, and there was an average of 13 authors per syllabus, and she found overall that 8% of the authors were women, 60 out of 739. 30 of the syllabi had no women at all. Of the 46 non-ethics courses, 6% of the authors were women. If you're not in ethics, it's even harder to get there. 6%, 36 out of 602. Then, 24 of the non-ethics had no women at all.

So you're seeing not just difficulty in terms that women are not entering the profession. They're not getting the jobs. And then once they're in the profession, it's like they're not even there, even when they're there. Not at the intro level, not in the top journals, not in the references. And so, the upshot is that the public face of philosophy

looks pretty much the way that we painted it. Look at a couple hundred years ago... there are a lot of white men discoursing about death and how better it is than life. And so, where is Xanthippe here? Well, she's back here, and that's kind of where women are in the profession. Relative to all the action going on here, and this incredibly muscular 70 year old guy, she's being let off. Again, what is going on here?

Let me move on to the next section...What are we doing about this? Well, the first thing is just plain listening. It's probably the most important step to get things going to just hear what what is going on from the perspective of the females in the profession. A lot of these have been initiatives by the Women in Philosophy Task Force, which was established by Sally Haslanger and other people a couple years ago. Some of these--the most important probably single one, has been Jennifer Saul's blog, What is it like to be A Woman in Philosophy? If you've never looked at it, you should, and it will be shocking to you. She began, she wrote a recent Salon piece about her experience setting up this blog. All the stories that she started getting of actionable things, like lawsuit worthy kinds of stories, as well as just all the micro-aggressions. It's not just women having sexual advances by professors, it's also just the way women, female graduate students will be ignored, the way they'll ask a question and nobody responds to it, and then 10 minutes later, one of the guys asks the very same question and it's a fabulous question. Which female in this room has not had that experience various times? All of those things.

It's not just the sexual advancement aspect, but it's also the rejection aspects. After a couple of years of this and gathering all this anecdotal, but still important testimonial evidence, they also started a What We're Doing About What It's Like blog, which is also a wonderful resource for all these initiatives. On the handout that Rachel and I made up, I have the urls for these websites. if you're sort of wondering, what can I do? How can I help? or is there anything I can do even in my position, whatever your position might be... What We're Doing About What It's Like is a very good place to look.

More recently, we set up a website called Philosophical Spaces. Again, you could just look up Philosophical Spaces, and that's where if you have a particular questions about the climate in your department, something going on, you can ask there and various volunteers from the Women in Philosophy Task Force are there to answer these questions. So you post a question and then some people will post various proposals, suggestions for what you should do about that. These are ongoing online always accessible initiatives that you can access.

I mentioned Jennifer Saul starting that blog What is It like to be a Women in Philosophy and then writing a Salon piece. Salon contacted Jenny Saul because of Colin McGinn, so it's really important when you get a poster person up there, the media as a whole pays attention. One of the things that she wrote in her Salon piece was the following: one of the stories I got was this, "There was an undergraduate whose professor joked openly about pouring hot wax on her nipples. This was in front of the table full of faculty members. What did they do? They laughed! This may well have been nervous laughter, but it made the student feel that the joke was acceptable and that she was oversensitive and contributed strongly to her feelings of discomfort in the department."

I'm not sure why she'd feel discomforted by that, but it's sort of obvious to me. This gives you a flavor of the sorts of stories that were being posted on this blog. She was night after night skyping with people who had had a particular experiences where they didn't know what to do. This was completely underground. Again, it was the McGinn affair that started to open people's minds to there's actually stuff going on. You couldn't just sweep it under the rug anymore.

So as well as all the listening and that, there's also looking. All the data that I presented is all sparked by Let's find out what exactly the problem is. It's not just a matter of finding out the numbers of various types of underrepresentation, but it's also now at a point of testing hypotheses. One of the first is Buckwalter, and Stich, they have the different intuitions hypothesis, where they hypothesize that a lot of the intuitively correct answers to philosophical scenarios where you're supposed to have a particular intuitive response, sort of a priori philosophy that experimental philosophy has been arguing against, they argue that women have different intuitions on these things, and because their intuitions are different from the ones that are supposed to be correct, somehow this meant they were not suited for philosophy, and this in turn would cause them to not pursue philosophy further. There are studies which could replicate their data, and in fact, some of the studies that they cited for the intuitions did show that the women actually had the "right" intuitions and the men did not. This is a new way that people are now addressing the issue is to see why aren't there as many women in philosophy as one might otherwise expect, so there's just different hypotheses being tested. Like I mentioned before, there's the hypothesis that women think philosophy is a very mathematical discipline and they don't like that. I find that implausible just because there's more women getting mathematics PhDs, but you know, you may not think that's a good reason.

Louise Anthony has responded to Buckwalter and Stich--their paper was circulated for a number of years before it got published, so even though hers came out after theirs it's still a response to it. She puts forward what she calls the perfect storm hypothesis which is basically there's a number of different elements: implicit bias, stereotype threat, counteracting, combining with interacting with, a certain female tendency to think of certain intellectual abilities as fixed, as opposed to something that you can develop. So her view is that it's not going to be just one particular cause, there's going to be a number of interacting causes.

And , more recently, there's a forthcoming paper by Adleberg, Thompson, and Nahmias. They've done a lot of work at Georgia State. They suggest, they haven't tested this, but they found that when they surveyed their intro students one interesting thing they found was that women were no more likely than men to think that philosophy was too argumentative or too combative. That's another hypothesis is that the argumentative style of philosophy turns women off. They found at least in their sample of introductory students at Georgia State taken over 2 years, 2012, 2013, they found that women didn't think it was any more argumentative. They didn't care. What they did find was that women were more likely to think that philosophy was not relevant to their lives as a practical matter. More than men. So they're thinking, maybe the issue here is just that women are not being... they're just more attuned-- we're generalizing here-- to, "What's this degree going to do for me? What kind of a job am i going to get?" That may be of more concern to women for various reasons. So again, these are just hypotheses,

there's no consensus on what the causes are, but at least people are now out looking, surveying, and trying to find out.

As far as acting, those in the profession, you may've heard of the Gendered Conference Campaign which was launched at the blog Feminist Philosophers in 2009-- Jennifer Saul and other people involved with that. Here, the idea was just to raise awareness. There were different ways of formulating how conference organizers should be contacted, but the general idea was just to raise awareness to conference organizers, and therefore, to the profession, of the very all-male lineups of the invited speakers. You could go to the lists of speakers at any of these conferences and you'd just see all men. Again, how are the women being erased from this? And so, the Gendered Conference Campaign called people out on this, basically. They did it nicely and people responded, so now you do see more women being invited to conferences. Of course, being an invited speaker is a nice thing. You're more visible when you're one of the invited people as opposed to a group session or submitted paper session or something like that. If you're a keynote that says something. I know there's no data, but it seems to have been...to be successful. That's just anecdotally.

Second important big thing was the Site Visit program. Peggy DesAutels at University of Dayton was instrumental in bringing this to fruition, and Carla Fehr as well, who has been involved with a number of NSF grants, in working with physics, because physics had a gender problem, and still does at least in many physics subareas. They've been working with the NSF using advance grants to figure out how to increase gender diversity in physics. The site visit program for philosophy was modeled on the physics site visit program. In physics, you can go to the American Physical Society website and it's an honor. Departments invite the Site Visit teams to give them a stamp of approval, "you're doing good things to ensure diversity and so forth." So it's the same thing transferred to the philosophy departments, and the idea, again, is a team of 3 people go to a department, they talk to faculty, they talk to students, and they assess what people think about what's going on in the department, how people feel, they take surveys of the people there, and then they issue a report based on that. It's intended to be an internal thing, in that whoever invites the team to the campus gets the report, and that's that.

What happened at Colorado Boulder...it's not clear what the administration at Boulder wanted to do, and there seemed to be other stuff going on, but in any case, the administration released the report, much to the horror of the department, which explicitly did not want this to become another McGinn case. Again, thanks to McGinn. So it blew up into something else, and caused a lot of backlash to the site visit program. This was the very first site visit, and so, it's sort of like, if this is the kind of back lash that it's going to get, how can we get more departments to agree to invite a team? So far, it seems like there have been more Site Visits since. I think the hullabaloo over Boulder will work itself out. That is available for any department that wants to have their climate assessed, how things are. You don't have to have a problem to invite the team. You can invite them and have them assess what's going on, and they can probably give you pointers that will help, not just the women in the department but anyone in the department. If graduate students are not feeling mentored enough, that can be something that's male and female--it doesn't have to go along gendered lines.

Again, Jennifer Saul and Helen BeeBee in the UK, the Society for Women in Philosophy came up with a fabulous document which is posted online at the APA Committee for the Status of Women website. All of these are available there, and they're on the handout. They came up with a document of good practices initiatives, which is all about what to do in various aspects of academia in terms of improving the climate. Also, they've been very important in raising awareness of issues of implicit bias and stereotype threat. For those who are not familiar with stereotype threat, the problem is that members of an underrepresented group, or of anybody, when you internalize certain gender schemas or schemas for whatever group, and then when that aspect of you gets emphasized, such as when you are in an underrepresented situation, you have this tendency to act according to the stereotype. For example, the stereotype of girls not being good at mathematics: if you tell girls in a study, "girls are bad at mathematics," you have them read something about it, and then you give them a math test to do, they will do worse because their gender schema has just been activated by reading this little vignette or description of women being bad at math.

A final thing: there are a lot of summer institutes or workshops. These are becoming more common. Rutgers has their 17th annual for diversity in philosophy coming up in July, and the deadline for that is May 7th, so you still can apply to that. Others... there's UCSD starting this year, the Ludwig Maximilians University in Munich, Penn State, all those three, their deadlines have passed. In fact, the UCSD deadline just passed 4 days ago, and I asked can you extend it after Rice, and they said, "Sorry, we can't do that." But for future years, these are sorts of various sorts of workshops for graduate and undergraduate students, female students. Then, there's the Princeton Center for Human Values, which also has a mentoring workshop for graduate students.

There's also another website, Minorities in Philosophy, MIP, which is online peer and faculty mentoring, so, graduate students can contact--there's a list of people on the website, and they can contact some person who is on that list for some sort of mentoring advice. Sort of like micro-mentoring, you don't have a specific person assigned to you, but if you have a specific question, you can ask a specific person about that. If you're in Philosophy of Mind, you may look down the list and say, you know, I want to know what to do about this, I'm in Philosophy of Mind, so I'm going to contact this particular person.

Then finally, the most recent stuff, I think, is a lot of classroom related initiatives. Textbook reviews, a number of women that I've talked to, in the Women in Philosophy Task Force, they are asked to do reviews of textbooks. So, the textbook data I showed you before about the low representation of women in textbooks...women who are asked to do reviews of textbooks are responding to the publishers, "I'm not going to use this textbook because it had no women in it!"--and they listen. What you're seeing is revisions of textbooks to be more inclusive because when you tell a publisher that you're not going to use their textbook because it's so lopsided, that hits their bottom line, and so, they're gonna do something about it. All of this is in the pipeline. There's also online resources for syllabi. A lot of people wonder, "How do I get more women on my syllabus? I don't know. What are the women writing in these areas? What's appropriate for the introductory classes that I'm doing?" There's more of that going on as well, and I've provided some urls on the handout. Just recently, UNC Chapel Hill is in April

holding a workshop on retaining female philosophy majors. That's another new initiative. So, that's a very brief overview of all the things that are being done.

Let me just address a few questions, worries, about all this. Mainly, are we in some sense being unfair? There's a question: are hiring practices now unfairly skewed to women? And I've heard this in my own department, "Women are getting all the jobs." If you think back, it's been a 20% roughly over decades, that probably is not true unless every woman that exits is replaced by another woman and the only jobs available are those jobs. Then, you could maintain the same, and be it true that all people hired are women, but that's not what's happening. Let me just give you some hiring numbers, recent ones. First of all, hiring does appear to be more or less proportionate to the number of women. Miriam Solomon and John Clark, 2009, did a study of the jobs advertised in the JFP, Jobs for Philosophers in 2007, which is all the positions. They found that they were just not cracking the 22% ceiling. Then I did a hand count, which actually Richard did as well, of the Leiter Report posted jobs, which are a biased sample. The stuff that's posted on Leiter is simply not a representative sample of all the jobs, and certainly up until March 18, it's not a representative sample. In any case, of that group you had 36 out of 109 that were posted, about 33%, and that includes tenure track jobs, post docs, and this is all high profile stuff. You're still getting-- that's probably a high number, again, this is a very biased sample. It certainly means that women are not getting all the jobs because even in this small sample, men are still getting 67% of the jobs. If you ever hear, as I have heard, women are getting all the jobs, it's not empirically true.

Second thing is that just because we're aware of problems, doesn't mean that they're gone. There's a persisting female disadvantage. It's not like being aware that there are issues suddenly makes them disappear that now, women are suddenly being assessed fairly. There's a lot of studies in psychology, some of the most famous where you have participants look at CVs that are absolutely identical, except you change the name on the CV from "John" to "Jane" and that's the only difference between the 2 CVs. Men and women judge the female CV to be less qualified, less good, than the male CV. That's the only difference between them. There's still a difference in competency perception that people just have. This is not somebody else, this is us, we all grow up with these gender schemas, as Virginia Valian says in her book, "Why so slow." She goes through how very, very, very tiny differences of perceived competence can accumulate over time and result in quite a different distribution at the end when you're at the job level, or at the higher level, job level. What happens is anything basically that emphasizes maleness, such as underrepresentation of men in nursing, is often seen as a small plus. Anything that emphasizes femaleness, like underrepresentation of women in philosophy, is a small minus. I should say that that study that I mentioned in the very beginning actually showed that this was true for underrepresented men, in particular professions. That rather than that being something that caused people to reject, it actually was a plus for these men. Kind of interesting how they found data backing up her own work.

The perceptions that we have, we still have them. They are still active in our assessments of job candidates, of people giving talks, of students. They're all still there. It's good to be aware, and that's how you start to address these things, but it's not as if a magic wand has been swooshed and now, it's just that women are it's totally female

oriented... [Second thing, from the point of view of a woman, and of course, men, graduate students say, they got the job because they're a woman, and that can be both sides.] The men will say, "She got the job because she's a woman". And the woman may think, "I got the job because I'm a woman."

So, first thing is being female and being qualified are consistent properties. It doesn't take a lot of logic to figure that one out. I think more importantly, it's important to recall that it's not as if before now, there was a default state in which everything was purely meritocratically judged. We're sort of thinking, anytime that a women gets discouraged, at any point along the trajectory, that's a plus for the guy. What did he do to deserve that? Well, he might not have done anything, but as long as relatively speaking, the women are being discouraged, the men are getting the jobs, or getting the benefits of mentoring because they're men. That's not necessarily--people don't like to think about, well, everybody wants to think they got it because they're qualified, not because of they're sex, but of course, if you have an imbalance, where one group is being discouraged in various ways, then the other group just automatically gets the benefit of not belonging to that group.

This was raised to me by somebody at a recent talk. The default assumption is that society's goods should go to the white males. When you try to change that, somehow this is not being fair, or somehow unjust. The response there was that, well, since when is that the right way that society should be organized? That's a bigger issue, I'm not going to go into, but it's just the idea of what we're talking about here fundamentally is how the goods in society are going to get distributed, and you can't assume that the defective default traditional distribution has until now been fair and entirely based on merit.

Finally, two smaller points: isn't this going to weaken the content of philosophy? If you have more women, and say you have more feminist philosophy being taught or discussed? if you have more feminist philosophy articles in top journals, isn't this going to somehow bring down the quality of the profession? I think there's a certain amount of that that goes on. I should emphasize, I don't do feminist philosophy. I do neuroscience and cognitive science. I care about injustice, but it's not like my work gains by any of this, it has nothing to do with it. But that doesn't mean that I'm not aware that people do do feminist philosophy--why think that that is somehow not philosophy in some way? Which is what it has been called.

One thing is just because you're using an author who is a female, you shouldn't assume that that is somehow a weaker article, it's not as good. Where does that assumption come from? Just because it hasn't been used, just because it hasn't been canonized, doesn't mean that therefore it's worse because what gets canonized reflects, again, these sort of biases that we all bring to the table. And so, it's incorrect to assume that because it's there, it somehow got there because it was purely a merit process. Then, of course, feminist philosophy, again, I said I don't do it, but that doesn't mean that it should be treated with disdain, it's not philosophy.

Then finally, you have the sort of Feminazi problem, well, it's all PC, and they're just ruining it. And in particular, now we can't just have nice, friendly, jokey situations, can't go out for drinks... One of the interesting responses to the CU Boulder report was they said, "you should stop having all these meetings and things that are after hours,

fueled with drinking"--that's just bad situation. Again, the Site Visit Program is not providing guidelines for everybody. It's providing recommendations for particular departments, given their very particular situation. In the Boulder situation, they were recommending have things occur during normal working hours for people who have kids, and don't always have it fueled with drinks, in fact don't have any drinks at all. But it wasn't intended to say there should be no drinking anywhere. Then, should professors be barred from having relationships with students? That's a very interesting issue that we can talk about at some point, but I thought Louise Anthony had a very interesting article. There was a series in the New York Times right after McGinn. McGinn is like the gift who keeps on giving. They had a series of I think it was 5 prominent, Jennifer Saul wrote one, Louise Anthony wrote one... Louise basically just said, control yourself -- that's just a part of life. You don't go around blurting racist epithets. If you think things, that's your business, but behavior is really important, and there's certain things that we do not do, once you're not a child, that enable you to operate pretty well in a nice social environment, and it's just part of life. It's just part of what it is to become an adult--is to stop acting out everything. And so, she was like, "Get used to it, you can't just say these things anymore and think they're going to be funny or picked up or anything like that." The quote that I had before with Jennifer Saul, with dripping hot wax on somebody's nipples, obviously somebody thought that was really funny, and the people around the table thought it was funny or they laughed nervously, but in any case, control yourself. It's not hard thing on you to not say these things, even if you're thinking them. I thought she kind of nailed it on that one.

Also, I should say in terms of the dating issue...I saw in the Chicago Reader just a few days ago, that all faculty at Northwestern have been prohibited from dating undergraduates. Now, I have had conversations with people about why, I mean, what sort of sexual restrictions should there be about relationships? This is something that is being negotiated now. I'm not going to go into it, but it is a really interesting issue of: should the undergraduates be considered a pool of potential partners? Or should half of them be considered a potential pool of partners? Should anybody walking into your classroom be considered a potential partner? I don't know --that's something to be talked about, but at Northwestern, they just prohibited it.

So, I think I've gone through everything that I wanted to, and I just wanted to give one final take home message here. One is just that the bad news, the profession does have a problem, I think that's pretty clear. What the causes are, not clear. The entire dimensions of it are not clear, but something is obviously afoot, and it's becoming more apparent to a lot of people, and so, I don't think there's a question that there's something, right. And that it is in some sense problematic. The good news is that more people are getting involved in addressing it. There's more websites that are available. More people getting involved and so forth. This is all good. Then, there's just the fine print that I want to say, which is philosophers are people. We shouldn't think of ourselves as somehow being above all these gender schemas and assumptions and biases and stereotyping of people and so forth. We're just not as objective as we think we are. We have a bias to think that we're more objective, and we should forget that. Gender, or any sort of schemas, these things don't die a natural death just by ignoring them. You have to actually work on it.

[So, that's the end of my...]